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Abstract
Reducing levels of child poverty (as well as poverty in general) in a way 
that can be sustained over time requires not only policy measures that 
create opportunities and future capabilities. It also depends on having a 
social protection system that keeps pace with economic and social change 
and is appropriate across all communities, and which does not itself 
preclude individual risk-taking and initiative. Some conflict is inevitable 
between the goal of providing adequate social protection for those unable 
to support themselves and that of maintaining incentives to work and 
to save for those who have the potential to do so. Nevertheless, there 
are aspects of the design and evolution of cash benefits (and associated 
policies) that can improve the terms of the trade-off between the two  
goals. This paper draws on the experience of the United Kingdom’s 
child poverty agenda over the last eight years, and on assessments of  
the prospects for a sustained reduction in child poverty in the future, to 
explore what these features might be. It also considers evidence from 
international comparisons of poverty and social protection systems. 
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers “social investment” in two ways. First, it considers what a 
framework for policy might look like that lays the basis for sustained poverty reduction. 
Second, it focuses on obvious ways to invest in the future: investment in children 
and reduction in poverty among children. The term “good housekeeping” in the title 
refers not to Margaret Thatcher’s exhortation to “live within one’s means”2 but rather, 
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since investment usually involves borrowing of one kind or another, it is intended as 
a reference to the need for social policy to have a stable and consensual framework 
to work within. Drawing on the experience of the United Kingdom’s child poverty 
agenda over the last eight years, and on assessments of the prospects for a sustained 
reduction in child poverty in the future, I explore what lessons can be learned that 
might be relevant in other countries. 
The next section explains how the UK targets for child poverty were set, briefly 
describes the associated policy reforms, and provides an assessment of their effects and 
prospects for the future. Several key issues for the longer term are identified and two 
of them are discussed in the following two sections: respectively, the basis for the 
regular uprating of benefits (and tax thresholds) and the complexities of understanding 
what matters in determining whether child poverty will fall in a sustained way. A 
subsequent section draws on evidence from the other countries of the EU about the 
relationships between cash support for children and child poverty. The concluding 
section summarises the main points of the paper and finishes with some open questions 
for discussion.
CHILD POVERTY IN THE UK:
WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN?
As is well known, the UK government has set targets for reducing child poverty and 
eventually “eliminating” it by 2020. The original pledge was made unexpectedly 
by Tony Blair in a lecture in March 1999 where he undertook to “end child poverty 
forever” within 20 years (Blair 1999). An immediate target was set of cutting the child 
poverty rate by a quarter against a relative target between 1998/99 and 2004/05.3 Since 
then a more elaborate series of targets has been established, which to some extent 
recognise the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, some of which are backed up by 
the authority of Public Service Agreements (PSA).4 
There is a PSA target to halve the number of children in relative low-income 
households between 1998/99 and 2010/11. Relative low-income households are 
those with income below 60% of the contemporary equivalised median, measured 
without deducting housing costs. Meeting this target would mean reducing the 
number of poor children in Britain to 1.7 million. 
•
Here and throughout, unless otherwise stated, poverty is considered to be living in a household with 
equivalised income below 60% of the national median. 
These are agreements between HM Treasury and the spending Departments in the UK.
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There is a second tier of the 2010/11 target (without a PSA) to reduce the number 
of children in “absolute low income” to under 1 million. Absolute low income is 
having an income below the 1996/97 poverty line, indexed for inflation. The latest 
estimate, for 2004/05, is 1.4 million children below this poverty line.5 
A third tier – currently in the form of a commitment to set an additional target 
(see Harker 2006) – consists of a measure of material deprivation and low income 
combined: a child is considered poor if it is both measured as being materially 
deprived (lacking a series of essential goods and services) and being in a household 
with income below 70% of the contemporary median.
Child poverty will be considered to be falling if all three measures are moving in 
the right direction (DWP 2003). Success in “eradicating child poverty” – the implicit 
target for 2020 – is being interpreted as having a material deprivation rate for children 
that approaches zero, together with having a relative child poverty rate that is “among 
the best in Europe”. Exactly what this means is not clear but has been assumed to 
be equivalent to a child poverty rate that is in single figures like those of the Nordic 
countries. Figure 1 shows the latest available figures for child poverty rates in the EU, 
corresponding to 2003 incomes. The value of 22% is lower than that shown for the 
UK at the time when child poverty reduction became a high profile policy goal (using 
1998 incomes) at 29%. Nevertheless it remains far short of being one of the lowest 
rates in Europe, at the sixth highest in the EU25.6 
•
•
DWP (2006) Tables B1 and 9D.
These figures should be treated with caution. Child poverty is measured at the EU level for children 
aged 15 and under whereas the UK national estimates also count children aged up to 19, if in full-time 
secondary education. The 1998 estimates make use of the European Community Household Panel 
data collected in 1999 for all EU15 countries whereas the 2003 estimates use EU-SILC data for 12 of the 
EU25 countries and various national sources for the remainder (including the UK). Thus differences across 
time or between country may be due to non-comparability of data sources as well as actual differences 
in child poverty rates.  
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Figure  Child Poverty Rates in the European Union, 998 and 00 Incomes
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Source: Eurostat 2007 Table 4.1 and Eurostat 2003:66
I return to how the UK might learn lessons from its EU neighbours in the section “What 
do other countries do?” Here, I consider further the extent to which British child poverty 
rates have fallen and how far child poverty rates must fall if the targets for 2010/11 and 
2020 are to be met. 
In 1998/99 the British child poverty rate (at 24% using national conventions for 
measurement) was among the highest in Europe and the OECD. It fell to 19% (according 
to the latest estimate for 2004/05), at least partly due to the policy measures introduced 
in response to concern about this situation. The trajectory is shown in Figure 2 alongside 
the path that child poverty rates should follow if there was to be a smooth reduction in 
child poverty to meet the 2004/05 target followed by the 2010/11 and 2020 targets (the 
level corresponding to “among the best in Europe” being assumed to be 5%). As can 
be seen, the 2004/05 target was not quite met: child poverty fell by 23% of its level in 
1998/99 rather than the targeted 25%. In order to speculate whether the fall in child 
poverty can continue on a sustained basis, or even accelerate in order to meet the 
targets, we need to understand what contributed to the reduction observed so far. 
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Figure  Great Britain Child Poverty Rates: Actual and Targeted Levels
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Effects of Policy Reforms
From 1999 onwards a whole battery of policy reforms was introduced with the aim of 
reducing child poverty. These ranged from increasing benefit payments for children, to 
devising new forms of cash support for parents with low earnings, to encouraging and 
enabling entry into paid work (particularly for lone parents), to setting up new services 
for disadvantaged children. For more information about the specific policy measures, 
see HM Treasury (2004). 
It is not straightforward to establish how much the extra measures cost or how great 
their effect. One estimate is that up to 2004 the cash income changes amounted to an 
increase in spending equivalent to 0.6% of GDP on child-contingent parts of the tax-
benefit system and 0.3% on services for children, not including education (Hills and 
Sutherland 2004). The Treasury itself expressed the spending on benefits and credits 
for children over the same period as a “real terms rise of 72%” (HM Treasury 2004). 
This serves to pose the question of what to assume about the counterfactual policies 
(what would have happened otherwise) and, relatedly, what to assume about how 
taxes and benefits should adjust over time. This latter point is considered in the 
following section, “Principles for regular tax–benefit uprating”. 
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Generally the approach to policy reform has been, on the one hand, to seek solutions 
through “work for those who can; security for those who cannot” (DfEE/DSS 1998) 
and, on the other hand, to “focus both on the direct ways of helping today’s children 
and on improving the capacity of tomorrow’s parents to lead fulfilling lives, free of 
poverty” (Hirsch 2006:49). In essence, this latter agenda has been seen as being best 
addressed through improvements in the effectiveness of formal education.7 
The focus of this paper is on the medium-term agenda. Delivering a higher-capacity 
generation of parents through improved educational outcomes may well contribute to 
lower child poverty rates, and policy with this aim is clearly an appropriate component 
of any long-term strategy. At the same time, if child poverty rates do not continue to fall 
in the short and medium term, and the medium-term target in 2010/11 is missed by a 
long way, it is implausible that improved parental capacity alone can deliver 
the eradication of child poverty by 2020. (It is also, of course, uncertain whether 
educational outcomes can be improved enough and fast enough, or whether such 
changes necessarily lead to the returns to work that are required to have a major impact 
on child poverty.)
The evidence in Figure 2 suggests that the medium-term target might be met through 
“more of the same”, given that the strategy so far has been quite successful, even though 
the 2004/05 target was not met. The trend appears to be downward at about the right 
gradient. However whether this is feasible depends on our assessment of why child 
poverty rates did fall. The two main drivers were an increase in parental employment 
and the direct boost to incomes provided through increased out-of-work benefit rates 
(for children) and a new and more generous system of in-work tax credits. While it 
is generally agreed that work is the best route out of poverty, it has been estimated 
that only one-sixth of the child poverty reduction shown in Figure 2 is due to growth 
in parental employment (Hirsch 2006). Entry into work is not a guarantee against 
poverty, even with a tax-credit system in place, and there are limits to the amount 
of new employment that can be created and sustained that is both in the right place 
and of the right type for parents of young children to take up. Between 1997 and 2001 
employment increases accounted for about half the fall in child poverty (Sutherland 
et al. 2003) but taking the period 1998/99 to 2004/05 as a whole it seems that the main 
driver was increased incomes for families who qualified for increased cash support. 
This included both couples (one-earner) and lone parents, as well as workless families 
(Brewer, Goodman et al. 2006). 
And, indeed, making “Education, education, education” the top priority for the incoming Blair 
Government pre-dates the child poverty reduction commitments (Blair’s 1996 Labour Party 
Conference speech).
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Moreover, whether the increase in employment was directly due to government 
employment-related policies is another matter. The tax credits were intended to increase 
parental employment by making work pay and there is evidence of small increases 
in employment that would not have happened otherwise (Brewer and Browne 2006, 
Gregg et al. 2006). It seems likely that employment effects due to a growing economy 
overwhelm the responses to changes in benefits and credits. As Hirsch (2006:46) puts 
it “Quantifying the contribution made by public policy is extremely difficult, but best 
estimates are that it has raised the proportion of couples with work by about 1 per cent 
and the proportion of lone parents with work by about 5 per cent (Gregg et al. 2006)”.
Arguably, the main roles of the in-work income support system have been to 
(a) increase the incomes of low-paid parents and (b) to maintain incentives at a time 
when incomes of parents not in work were being raised. 
Looking Ahead
Any strategy to keep child poverty rates falling as shown in Figure 2 requires continued 
efforts to encourage parents to take paid work, while also recognising that cash payments 
to families with children will have the major role, either performing a social protection 
function, or in maintaining (and improving) work incentives. But simply maintaining 
the value of cash payments in real terms will not be sufficient on either count. Relative 
poverty is measured by comparing disposable incomes with those at the overall 
median. Many components of market income typically rise faster than prices, so the 
poverty line rises in nominal terms at a faster rate than cash payments, which are 
usually indexed for inflation. To even keep poverty rates constant, benefit payments 
have to be increased at the same rate as (net) market income or targeted increases in 
particular benefits need to be made. The latter corresponds to the UK government’s 
strategy and we have seen benefit and tax credit rates for children increased by more 
than inflation (and the child tax credit amount per child will be increased with earnings 
over the medium term). Of course, to increase incomes of recipients of these transfers 
relative to the median (and hence reduce child poverty rates) requires regular increases 
of more than the growth in average incomes. In other words, these benefits need to take 
a larger share of the public cake. There are three risks associated with this strategy.
First, and most obviously, other groups might legitimately resist their share of cake 
becoming smaller. The alternative of a bigger cake – increases in public spending overall 
– is not considered in full here, but may well be inevitable in the short or medium 
term if real investment is to be made. Second, and relatedly, hiking up payments for 
children risks unbalancing the structure of payments. Some children in the UK are 
already entitled to higher payments than certain adults. This may not be ruled out 
from a design point of view – since it could be argued that developing children have 
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greater needs than some adults. But experiencing a sudden drop in income – on one’s 
birthday – could be problematic for individuals and their families and is not likely to be 
popular. Thirdly, it may actually be less efficient in reducing child poverty measured 
using household income to target children rather than all individuals in the household. 
This is clearly the case in a mechanical sense: one child in a household of several adults 
would require a very large benefit increase to lift them all (including the child) above 
the poverty line. There may also be subtler ways in which relying on targeting children 
with cash payments rather than supporting adults – or anyone who can benefit from 
support at their particular stage in the life cycle – might not be effective in correcting 
the underlying problems. 
Another relevant factor is the number of children. This is predicted to fall in Britain 
and this has two effects on the prospects. First, there is again a mechanical point: the 
targets are carefully worded in terms of the reduction of numbers of children in poverty. 
If the rate of poverty remains constant while the overall number of children falls, the 
number of poor children also must fall. The more complex point is whether a society 
with a lower proportion of children allocates more resources (of all sorts) per child or 
whether the slice of cake shrinks and resources follow the demographic groups that 
are growing in relative size (in this case, quite obviously, the elderly). 
So what are the prospects for meeting the 2010/11 target of reducing UK child 
poverty by a half since 1998/99? One estimate, based on rolling out existing policies, 
projections of demographic change and some fairly optimistic forecasts of employment 
growth among parents8 suggests that child poverty rates will be only very marginally 
lower in 2010/11 than in 2004/05: 2.65 million children will be in poverty instead of 
2.70 million in 2004/05 (Hirsch 2006). The same analysis estimates that the 2010/11 
target could be (almost) met with a substantial 43% real increase in the level of child 
payments in the Child Tax Credit (CTC). The CTC is targeted at low-income families 
with children whether or not they work; the child payments are tapered away rather 
slowly and after a large effective disregard for those in work, so the vast majority of 
poor and near-poor children are in households entitled to the CTC. However, receipt 
of the CTC, even at the greatly increased level modelled for 2010/11, would not be a 
guarantee against poverty. The proposed increase would cost £4.3 billion (or around 
0.3% of GDP) in 2010. There are, of course, other options and, for example, the same 
study explored the effects of using some of the resources on extra benefit for large 
families and on using the universal child benefit as a vehicle for part of the transfer 
to children. 
Lone-parent employment rises from 56% (in 2005) to 67.5% and worklessness in couples with children 
falls from 4.9% to 4.5% (Gregg et al. 2006, Brewer, Browne and Sutherland 2006).
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All such options are worth considering, and a finely tuned package of extra spending 
on cash support for children is undoubtedly necessary for the medium-term target to 
be met. However, there are two other factors that help in understanding why it is so 
hard to reduce child poverty rates and provide clues to what other issues need to be 
addressed. These are considered in some detail in the following sections. First, there 
is the question of how benefit rates and thresholds are updated as prices and incomes 
rise. If poverty is to be assessed against contemporary median incomes, then what can 
be done about the “running down the up escalator” aspect of the problem? At the level 
of principle this is a matter that applies similarly to all systems and countries and is 
discussed in the next section. 
Second, it is useful to reflect on the fact that most of the attempts between 1999 and 
2005 to predict the effect of policy reforms on child poverty came up with more 
optimistic outcomes (including meeting the 2004/05 target) than in fact occurred. There 
are a number of plausible explanations. Some are related to the techniques and data 
used for the predictions and others to the complexities of behavioural reactions to policy 
changes. These are discussed in the section “Predicting child poverty: What matters?” 
PRINCIPLES FOR REGULAR TAX–BENEFIT UPRATING9 
This section considers the principles underlying different ways of adjusting benefit 
rates and thresholds as prices and incomes rise. If benefits were designed to achieve 
across-the-board reductions in relative poverty, their values would need to rise at least 
with the benchmark used to set a poverty standard. In the context of the UK at present, 
this would mean keeping up with a measure of median household disposable income 
adjusted for household size. Similarly, if the tax and benefit system is constructed with 
the aim of affecting household income inequality, then adjustment in line with mean 
net or disposable income growth would be appropriate as a starting point. If this is not 
done, the shares of different people’s income taken in tax and granted in benefits will 
change, and with them the shape of the distribution. By contrast, if all incomes grow 
by the same proportion, and with them benefit rates and tax brackets, the relationship 
between net and gross incomes would stay the same, as would direct tax revenues as a 
share of aggregate income.
As a variant of this, some argue that the benefit rates that effectively determine society’s 
minimum income should be set explicitly to allow a minimum living standard set in 
relation to contemporary views to be achieved. Adjusting benefits in line with such 
“minimum income standards” requires a two-stage process: periodic recalibration of 
This section draws heavily on joint work with John Hills.9 
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what it is that is required for a minimum living standard, and then finding out what 
this costs to achieve given contemporary prices. Adjustments then follow a combination 
of the changing minimum (consumption) standards, and changes in prices. 
On the other hand, if benefits are seen in some way as a return on contributions, as is 
(in the UK case) loosely embodied in the national insurance system, then their values 
may be linked to what people have paid in or the “contribution base”. This might 
suggest a link with, for instance, gross earnings.
However, policy may be driven by questions of affordability, rather than by what might 
ideally be achieved. In this case it may be growth in the economy or potential tax base 
that is most relevant, for instance, GDP growth. At times of high growth, benefit levels 
would rise such that recipients had some share in the country’s increasing prosperity. 
By contrast, if benefits are designed to guarantee a particular real, but unchanging, 
standard of living, adjustment would need to be by prices.10 Generally this is the 
principle on which uprating takes place in the UK, as in the non-contributory parts 
of systems in many other countries. Given the relative movements of prices and the 
other benchmarks – earnings, GDP and mean and median disposable income – in recent 
years, this has tended to result in benefit levels (and tax thresholds) progressively 
falling behind the levels that would be achieved under any of the other uprating 
principles set out above (except, arguably, the minimum income standard principle).
However, such principles take for granted that the starting levels are what are in fact 
desired, and the only issue in adjustment is to keep them in line with the appropriate 
benchmark for the objective. However policymakers are often faced with the challenge 
of reforming a system from what is, from their point of view, an unsatisfactory starting 
point. Transitions to a new system are often made by using more or less generous 
uprating than implied by the underlying principle, until the intended structure is 
reached. This can be seen as a way of exploiting “money illusion” to disguise the 
losses that are occurring for some, or as a way of phasing in structural changes 
slowly in a way that minimises disruption to household budgets.
The difficulty of such adjustment from “policy disequilibrium” is that what is 
happening is seldom made explicit – indeed, sometimes the objective is precisely to 
disguise from some of those affected what is going on. So a final principle to guide 
uprating practice might be that of flexibility: to minimise the extent of statutory 
uprating, leaving the government free to make the adjustments that follow from their 
Potentially the adjustment could be by a price index specific to the group receiving the benefit. For 
instance, the aim may be to allow a pensioner to continue to purchase the same basket of goods, in which 
case the relevant price index is for that basket – or for a proxy, such as the “pensioner prices index”.
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political priorities and the economic circumstances, and permitting it to claim credit 
for increases that in fact only maintain the status quo (according to one principle 
or another). Having no rule at all could be quite consistent with sustainable and 
desirable outcomes if there was full public understanding of the issues at stake and if 
changes in benefits and taxes, as well as redistribution of incomes, were a major item of 
public discussion and democratic debate. This is rarely the case. 
PREDICTING CHILD POVERTY: WHAT MATTERS?
Predicting child poverty for some date later than the reference period for the available 
household micro-data can only be done approximately. Understanding why modelled 
predictions and eventual direct measures diverge can not only improve projection 
methodologies but also help us understand what is important for actual child 
poverty outcomes. First of all, demographic and other changes between the survey 
year and modelled year are difficult to account for precisely. Secondly, difficulty in 
predicting behavioural reactions to policy changes as well as to the changing economic 
circumstances introduces discrepancies and uncertainties. For example, non take-up 
of means-tested benefits and tax credits – difficult to measure and take account of in 
any case – has been higher in the case of the Child Tax Credit (CTC) than originally 
envisaged (Brewer, Goodman et al. 2006).11 
It also seems likely that analysis based on static tax-benefit modelling does not capture 
all the relevant change in household circumstance that in fact occurred over the six-year 
period (and might also over the following six years up to 2010/11). It is quite plausible 
that the reforms, combined with other trends and changes, have led to a somewhat 
different set of trade-offs for parents between paid work and not working. Indeed, it 
may in some circumstances be a lot easier for parents to achieve below-poverty-line 
levels of incomes than it is to construct combinations of work and care that offer just- 
above-poverty levels of income. Put another way, some parents may have taken the 
opportunity to reduce the amount they work once increased support through tax credits 
was available. Furthermore, it is still possible that parents do not understand the new 
system, as is suggested by low levels of take-up. And it is plausible that the system 
is somehow inappropriate for some types of families, as indicated by high levels of 
worklessness and child poverty within some ethnic minority populations (Platt 2006). 
It is the group of children in one-earner couple families who contribute the largest 
number to the remaining stock of children in poverty. Current debates in the UK centre 
around whether these families should be targeted further with state support (either 
Brewer, Goodman et al. (2006) also point out that the recording of CTC receipt in the Family Resources 
Survey data – used for most of the analysis reported in this paper – appears to be subject to non-response: 
thus the child poverty rate may in fact be lower than that measured using these data directly. 
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through the tax system or extra help through the introduction of an additional couple 
element in the tax credits) or whether the barriers to work for second earners due to the 
work disincentive effects of the existing tax credits should be addressed (Chote et al. 2007 
Chapter 12). The tax credits are means-tested on joint income resulting in second earners 
having a high effective marginal tax rate on the first £ earned. What this comes down to 
is an argument about the roles of mothers and whether they should be supported to be 
in paid work or not to be in paid work. Also important is the persistence of the gender 
pay gap, to the extent that it is this that turns women into “second” earners. 
Wage rates more broadly are clearly a factor too. For work to be effective as a child 
poverty reduction strategy, wage rates need to be high enough so that, when combined 
with in-work benefits and credits, family income is above the poverty line, as well 
as high enough to provide a real incentive to combine paid work with the tasks of 
parenthood. In Britain, in spite of a national minimum wage that is relatively high 
in international terms, it remains the case that 35% of poor children have a parent in 
full-time work (DWP 2006a Table E5). 
There may also be specific factors at work in some parts of the economy. For example, 
in London child poverty rates are higher than in the UK as a whole and have been more 
resistant to reduction.12 Reasons for this include the low level of parental employment 
in London, particularly among lone parents and particularly for part-time working 
(Buck et al. 2007). Not only does it appear that the supply of part-time jobs is lower 
than elsewhere but also – and relatedly – that part-time working for parents is costly 
or infeasible if travel is expensive and journey times long. (Similar issues may apply in 
rural areas.) Since the poverty risk of children in workless households or one-earner 
couple households is high, encouraging entry into part-time work (along with the 
provision of such jobs) may seem like a good idea, but this will only be effective if the 
returns for such working are worthwhile. 
Furthermore, the relationship between parental employment, child poverty and 
ethnicity is complex. Child poverty rates are lower for children of White parents than 
for any other of the major UK ethnic groups. However, employment rates are higher 
for Black Caribbean lone parents than White lone parents, and children with both 
parents earning are more common among Indian couples than among other groups 
(Buck et al. 2007). While the measures to tackle child poverty in lone-parent families 
have been shown to be relatively effective among Black children (where 69% of those 
This is on the basis of measures using income After Housing Costs (AHC). Most international comparisons 
and the rest of the analysis in this paper use Before Housing Costs (BHC) income measures. In London, 
BHC poverty rates are artificially depressed because of the inclusion of Housing Benefit in the BHC 
measure. High rents result in high Housing Benefit entitlements, making London incomes also seem 
high relative to nationally. But the benefit is entirely spent on the higher rents. AHC measures of income 
deduct rent from income. 
12 
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in poverty are living with a lone parent) poverty reduction among children living in 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani families – where lone parenthood is relatively rare – is much 
lower (Platt 2006). At least part of the explanation is in the prevalence of single-earner 
couples and the low rates of pay received by Bangladeshi and Pakistani men. As noted by 
Harker (2006) “the ethnic minority employment gap is too often dismissed as resulting 
from ‘cultural’ differences when there is clear evidence of the significant barriers that 
some ethnic minority groups face in entering and progressing in work” (p.28). 
Finally, one obvious failure of the tax credit strategy is that take-up rates remain low: 
some families simply do not receive their entitlements. The latest official estimates 
suggest that while the national take-up rate by lone parents for the combination of tax 
credits to which they are entitled while in low-paid work is between 86% and 95%, 
the corresponding range for couples with children is lower: between 71% and 75%. In 
London, the range for both groups of families is between 58% and 73% (HMRC 2006). 
Thus large proportions of low income families have lower incomes than they should. 
This, one way or another, is due to the complexity of the entitlement criteria and the 
claim process. The credits are means-tested and there may be stigma attached to a claim 
or to receipt. At least in the first years of introduction there were many overpayments 
which had to be repaid, possibly leading the system to be mistrusted by potential 
recipients. The claim process is complicated, requiring both partners in a couple to 
provide information and make a joint claim. There may even be misunderstandings 
related to the term “credit”: some potential claimants may believe that the payment 
is a loan and has (always) to be paid back. In any event, the means-tested character of 
the credits reduces their effectiveness relative to the universal child benefit which is 
also cheap to administer and widely accepted. 
WHAT DO OTHER COUNTRIES DO?
As explained above, the success of the UK child poverty strategy will be judged in the 
long term as having a child poverty rate that is among the best in Europe. We have 
seen that the child poverty rate remains one of the highest, even though the position 
has improved since 1998. The countries of the EU take very different approaches to 
the design of social protection systems and policies to make work pay. They also have 
widely diverging rates of lone parenthood, of parental worklessness and also fertility, 
earnings distribution and maternal employment. “Policy learning” across countries is 
part of the agenda to promote social inclusion and reduce poverty in the EU (Marlier et 
al. 2006). But it would be mistaken to think that a policy approach or package that was 
apparently successful in one country could be applied mechanically in the UK and be 
equally successful. 
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At the same time, it is instructive to compare the systems of support for children in the 
context of the child poverty rate, and the extent to which payments for children succeed 
in reducing the child poverty rate. Figure 3 shows the distributional incidence of child- 
contingent cash support in each of the EU15 countries in 2001. “Child-contingent” 
support includes not only family and child benefits but also additions or complements 
within other benefits (e.g. social assistance) that are paid by virtue of the presence of 
children, as well as tax concessions. The effect of benefits is indicated by the lighter 
parts of the bars. The effects of taxes are shown by the dark part of the bars. In the 
case of tax concessions such as child tax allowances these are shown as positive. In the 
case of taxes paid on child-contingent benefits, the effect is shown as negative. The net 
effect is the net amount received. (The amounts are the average payments per child 
and in order to make comparisons across countries with different income levels they 
are expressed as a percentage of average disposable income per head of population.13) 
The most striking feature is the very great differences across the 15 countries in terms 
of the size of the payments to children, how they are distributed across the household 
income distribution and whether delivery is through (net or gross) cash payments or 
tax concessions. 
The UK appears as a country with a relatively generous system for children, heavily, 
although not exclusively, targeted on households with low, and low-to-middle, incomes. 
(Since the calculations are for 2001, they pre-date many of the reforms discussed above. 
Such a diagram for today’s system of cash support for children would show higher 
amounts in the bottom half of the income distribution.)
One might expect child-contingent spending targeted at low incomes to be associated 
with a high degree of child poverty reduction, or put another way, to play a major 
role in protecting children from poverty. Figure 4 indicates whether this is so by 
comparing the child poverty rate in 2001 with what it would have been without the 
parts of the tax and benefit systems that are child-contingent (see Corak et al. 2005). 
This picture (dark bars) does not show what child poverty rates would look like 
were there no state support – in this event people would have to reorganise their 
lives in order to survive. Instead, it is a measure of the importance of state support to 
household incomes in keeping children above the poverty line. Countries are ranked 
by the child poverty rate using 60% of the national median as the poverty line (shown 
by the paler bars).
For more explanation of these calculations see Corak et al. (2005) and European Observatory on the Social 
Situation (2005).
13 
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Figure  Spending per Child on Child-Contingent Cash Payments in 00 by 
Decile Group
Note: Spending is expressed as a percentage of total per capita disposable income.
Source: EUROMOD, www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/
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Figure    The Child Poverty Rate in EU In 00, With and Without  
Child-Contingent Incomes and Without All Benefits (Including  
Public Pensions)
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It is not the case that the successful countries depend more heavily than the UK on the 
child-contingent system for keeping their children above the poverty line (indicated 
by the distance between the top of the paler bar and the top of the darker bar). The 
differences lie in the level of poverty risk before child-contingent support, which is 
much lower in the low child poverty countries like the Nordic countries, Belgium and 
Austria. They also lie in the nature of the support systems and here a number of distinct 
features are relevant: the extent of means-testing, the extent of child-targeting, the size 
of the system of state cash support for children and the way in which state support 
influences household composition. These are considered in turn, comparing the UK 
with countries where particular differences are evident.
The child poverty rate in Austria is half that in the UK. The Austrian system is largely 
contingent on circumstances and it is not primarily targeted by income, and yet the 
Austrian child support system has a similar effect on child poverty as that in the UK, 
which is heavily reliant on means-testing (Levy et al. 2007). 
Social Policy Journal of New Zealand • Issue 31 • July 2007
Good Housekeeping: Ensuring the Basis 
for Sustained Poverty Reduction
Furthermore, some support is provided indirectly for children through the non-child-
contingent parts of state support received by adults in the same household (such as 
state pensions or unemployment benefits, or social assistance payments for adults). 
The extent to which all cash benefits (including state pensions) protect children 
from poverty is shown by the dark points in Figure 4.14 In countries like the UK the 
additional role of adult payments is rather small. In Austria it is larger and this effect 
plus the effect of child-contingent payments reduces Austrian child poverty from the 
fourth highest (based on primary incomes) to the fifth lowest (based on disposable 
incomes). In Denmark and Sweden the effect on children of “adult” benefits is much 
larger. Poverty rates based on market incomes are rather similar in Sweden and the 
UK. Swedish child poverty is among the lowest in the EU15 countries with the 
contribution of benefits for adults being larger than the contribution of child- 
contingent payments. Bradshaw (2006) includes similar findings for Sweden. 
Several countries have small systems of child-contingent support: Spain, Greece and 
also the Netherlands are notable in this respect (Figure 3). They also have rather low 
rates of child poverty before the addition of child-contingent support and, in the case 
of the Netherlands and Greece before the addition of any benefits and pensions, where 
their rates are the lowest of the 15 countries (Figure 4). Low rates of poverty on the basis 
of primary incomes can arise because inequality in the distribution of primary income 
is relatively low, with few households receiving low or zero incomes. The Netherlands 
is one example of such a case.15 The other way in which low primary income child 
poverty arises is simply a result of a lack of a generous support system: households 
organise themselves such that dependants are supported by family members who do 
have market sources of income, or else prospective parents do not start families until 
they are able to support them. This is typical of the Southern European countries where 
fertility is low, where households may often contain three generations and where 
the age of leaving home on average is much later than in Northern or Central Europe 
(Aassve and Iacovou 2006). While it may appear that there is less for a child support 
system to do to protect children from poverty, this masks other long-term problems 
related to low fertility and delayed household formation. 
To summarise the lessons from other countries for the UK, it seems that a high 
child poverty rate based on primary income, while not in itself desirable, is not 
an insurmountable barrier to low child poverty rates based on disposable income 
(Sweden, Austria). It is not necessarily the case that high child-contingent payments 
However, note that tax concessions are not included in this measure and the effect of benefits is included 
gross of taxes. From Figure 3 we can see that taking account of taxes is likely to have a small effect on 
incomes in the bottom 20% of households only in Belgium, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (positively) 
and Finland (negatively).
Another factor is the fact that private pensions – making up a relatively large proportion of Dutch pension 
income – are counted as primary income in this analysis.
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are necessary for the child poverty rate to be low: a mix of child and adult instruments 
is in some cases more effective (Denmark, Sweden). Means-testing, while in the short 
run cheaper than providing the same high level of support to all children may be only 
somewhat less effective in terms of poverty reduction than a system that targets by 
contingency (Austria, and also Denmark, Sweden and Belgium).16 We do not know 
what effect family means-testing has in the long run on labour market and household 
formation behaviour. Nevertheless it appears from Figure 4 that systems that have 
relied on means-testing to a substantial extent for some time (UK, Ireland) are associated 
with high primary income poverty. 
CONCLUSIONS
I have considered aspects of social investment in two ways. Firstly, this has been done 
through the channel of children and by considering policy designed to improve the lot of 
children now, with a view to them reaching adulthood unscarred by poverty. Secondly, 
I have tried to identify the factors to be considered when thinking about tax and benefit 
policy, which could have a sustained effect in reducing child poverty over the medium 
and longer term. In the short term, targeting by income and on children as the group 
of concern may seem to follow obviously from the policy priority. Thus indexation of 
all payments and thresholds may seem like a secondary issue or one implying 
unnecessary increases in public spending. However, with a longer-term perspective 
there are strong arguments for:
a comprehensive and explicit uprating strategy 
less reliance on means-testing 
less reliance on child-targeting
broader appreciation of the costs and benefits of working for parents.
With this focus I have inevitably neglected some important issues. These include the 
share of spending that is devoted to services, rather than income support, for children. 
Related to this is the conceptualisation of poverty as something additional to, or 
distinct from, low household income. Many initiatives that are intended to improve the 
wellbeing of children or their future prospects as adults do not involve cash transfers 
and their effects would not be captured directly in income poverty measures. In the UK 
outcomes for children in some other important dimensions are monitored alongside 
income poverty in the form of Opportunity for All indicators. These include, for 
example, school attendance, smoking among children aged 11–15 and re-registrations 
on the child protection register (DWP 2006b). Over the period I have considered, 
most but not all the indicators have moved in the right direction or stayed constant. 
Exceptions include obesity in young children, the education gap among looked-after 
•
•
•
•
See also Levy et al. (2007), who test this explicitly. 16 
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children, infant mortality and families in temporary accommodation. In comparative 
perspective an aggregate index of an even broader set of indicators of child wellbeing 
recently ranked the UK at the bottom of 21 OECD countries (UNICEF 2007). 
However, it is extremely difficult to judge the extent to which either cash-based or non-
cash public policies in general, or even particular policies, have had an impact on these 
outcomes. For example, Sure Start is a programme initiated in 1999 to deliver “the best 
start in life for every child”, bringing together at a local level services such as early 
education, childcare, health and family support for families in disadvantaged areas. 
Although established as a long-term programme with long-term goals Sure Start Local 
Programmes (SSLPs) have been subject to an early evaluation which claimed that SSLPs 
benefit children of less socially deprived parents at the expense of those most deprived 
(Belsky et al. 2006). However, this evaluation has been contested on methodological 
grounds with the argument that some form of randomised control trial should have been 
used and that the poor outcomes for some children may have been due to unmeasured 
poor prospects at the start. Establishing “What works” is not straightforward. 
It is also important to highlight the importance of one particular resource and 
investment in children that cannot be provided by government but which can be 
influenced by it, and that is parental time and capacity to parent effectively. The focus 
on “work for those who can” risks ignoring the pressures placed on parents. This is 
well illustrated by a parent at a feedback event within the recent Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation project on What Will it Take to End Child Poverty?17 who said:
All my tax credits and most of my wages go to keeping my four kids; they’re in 
three different kinds of childcare and I’ve been working for six years and I’m 
not any better off for working. I’m playing at being an employee and playing 
at being a mum – can’t do either fully. (quoted in Hirsch 2006:29)
Being better off in work involves more than a mechanical financial calculation: it also 
requires the right sort of job with hours, flexibility, convenience and childcare to fit, 
providing enough pay and leaving enough time to spend being an effective parent. 
I will summarise this paper with a set of questions that it has, explicitly or implicitly, 
raised. They are none of them new, nor do they apply exclusively to the UK. 
Should the mechanisms, formulae and size of annual increases to benefits (and tax 
thresholds) be something determined by each government on a year-to-year basis, 
or should conventions be sought around which either consensus or dialogue might 
be developed? 
•
http://www.jrf.org.uk/child-poverty/17 
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If most of the decrease in worklessness has been due to a growing economy (rather 
than welfare-to-work policies), what kind of “making work pay policy” will be 
effective in a downturn? What policies encourage the creation of “good” jobs that 
can be combined with parenting?
What are the most effective approach(es) to increasing the income of one-earner 
couple parents?
Is targeting (cash) support at children rather than adults the best way to protect 
children from poverty?
What are the long-term effects of a mainly means-tested system of support?
REFERENCES
Aassve, A. and M. Iacovou (2006) “Youth poverty and transition to adulthood in 
Europe” Demographic Research, 15:21–40.
Belsky, J., E. Melhuish, J. Barnes, A.H. Leyland and H. Romanuik (2006) “Effects of 
Sure Start local programmes on children and families: Early findings from a 
quasi-experimental, cross sectional study” British Medical Journal, 332:1476. 
Blair, T. (1999) “Beveridge revisited: A welfare state for the 21st century” in R. Walker 
(ed.) Ending Child Poverty, Policy Press, Bristol.
Bradshaw, J. (2006) A Review of the Comparative Evidence on Child Poverty, Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, York. 
Brewer, M. and J. Browne (2006) The Effect of the WFTC on Labour Market Participation, 
IFS Briefing Note BN69, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Brewer, M., J. Browne and H. Sutherland (2006) Micro-Simulating Child Poverty in 
Great Britain in 2010 and 2020, National Poverty Center Working Paper #06–31, 
University of Michigan, www.npc.umich.edu/publications/workingpaper06/
paper31/.
Brewer, M., A. Goodman, J. Shaw and L. Sibieta (2006) Poverty and Inequality in Britain: 
2006, IFS Commentary 101, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Buck, N., H. Sutherland and F. Zantomio (2007) Implications of Demographic and Economic 
Change for Child Poverty in London, Report for the London Child Poverty 
Commission, http://213.86.122.139/publications/iser-rpt-0207.jsp.
Chote, R., C. Emmerson, A. Leicester and D. Miles (eds.) (2007) The IFS Green Budget: 
January 2007, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Corak, M., C. Lietz and H. Sutherland (2005) The Impact of Tax and Transfer Systems on 
Children in the European Union, Innocenti Working Paper No. 2005–04, UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, www.unicef.org/irc. 
Department for Education and Employment, and Department of Social Security (1998) 
A New Contract for Welfare: The Gateway to Work, Cm 4102, TSO, London.
Department for Work and Pensions (2003) Measuring Child Poverty, DWP, London.
Department for Work and Pensions (2006a) Households Below Average Income, 2004/5, 
The Stationery Office, London.
•
•
•
•
Social Policy Journal of New Zealand • Issue 31 • July 20070
Good Housekeeping: Ensuring the Basis 
for Sustained Poverty Reduction
Department for Work and Pensions (2006b) Opportunity for All – Eighth Annual Report 
2006, Cm 6915, The Stationery Office, London.
European Observatory on the Social Situation (2005) Network on Social Inclusion and 
Income Distribution Final Report, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/
social_situation/docs/sso2005_social_inclusion_report.pdf.
Eurostat (2003) Living Conditions in Europe: Statistical Pocketbook, Data 1998–2002, 
Eurostat, Luxembourg.
Eurostat (2007) Living Conditions in Europe: Statistical Pocketbook, Data 2002–2005, 
Eurostat, Luxembourg.
Gregg, P., S. Harkness and L. Macmillan (2006) A Review of Issues Relating to the Labour 
Market and Economy, Particularly in Terms of the Impact of Labour Market Initiatives 
on Children’s Income Poverty, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York.
Harker, L. (2006) Delivering on Child Poverty: what would it take? A report for the 
Department for Work and Pensions, Cm 6951 London: The Stationery Office.
Hills, J. and H. Sutherland (2004) “Ending child poverty in a generation? Policies and 
prospects in the UK” (mimeo).
Hirsch, D. (2006) What Would it Take to End Child Poverty? Firing on All Cylinders, Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, York. 
HM Revenue and Customs (2006) Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit Take up Rates 
2003–04, HMRC, London.
HM Treasury (2004) Child Poverty Review, TSO, London, www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk./spending_review/spend_sr04/associated_documents/spending_sr04_
childpoverty.cfm.
Levy, H., C. Lietz and H. Sutherland (2007) “Swapping policies: Alternative 
tax–benefit strategies to support children in Austria, Spain and the UK” Journal 
of Social Policy, 36(4).
Marlier, E., A.B. Atkinson, B. Cantillon and B. Nolan (2006) The EU and Social Inclusion: 
Facing the Challenges, The Policy Press, Bristol.
Platt, L. (2006) Ethnicity and Child Poverty, Report for the Ethnic Minority Employment 
Task Force, www.emetaskforce.gov.uk.
Sutherland, H., T. Sefton and D. Piachaud (2003) Poverty in Britain: The Impact of 
Government Policy since 1997, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York Publishing 
Services Ltd, York.
UNICEF (2007) An Overview of Child Well-Being in Rich Countries, Innocenti Report 
Card No. 7, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Florence. 
Social Policy Journal of New Zealand • Issue 31 • July 2007 
